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Introduction
One of the most famous examples of market failure involves a rational agent who underinvests in relationship-speci…c assets due to the possibility of an opportunistic behaviour on the part of her contractual partner. 1 This paper provides evidence that a strong banking sector can alleviate the adverse economic consequences of this well-known holdup problem by stimulating relationship-speci…c investment. Our work establishes a novel channel through which …nance a¤ects the real economy and promotes long-run growth.
It also complements the existing literature on economic speci…city that has stressed legally binding contracts as a standard solution to the holdup problem.
The distinguishing feature of relationship-speci…c assets is the fact that their value is greater within a relationship than outside it. A typical example would involve an upstream supplier who makes investments in order to customize her product for the needs of the downstream purchaser. After the investment is sunk, the buyer can refuse to meet her commitment and trigger ex post re-negotiation. The product was already adjusted for the needs of one speci…c purchaser, so the supplier will not be able to sell the product to a di¤erent customer at the original price. This is in the literature known as the holdup problem. As a consequence, the individually rational sellers will underinvest into relationship-speci…c assets, hurting the downstream …rms with negative rami…cations for aggregate growth.
The standard way to protect the party undertaking relationship-speci…c investment is to write a binding contract and to rely on the legal enforcement by the state. We argue that even if a detailed contract makes the original buyer willing to pay for a product the agreed price, she might be not able to do so due to some economic problems. The current …nancial crisis made this point painfully clear. The most e¤ective contract enforcement might fail to protect the supplier in tough times when the buyer lacks access to a reliable source of …nancing. To give a speci…c example, no level of institutional quality can protect the manufacturers of car parts intended for the big U.S. car companies.
Only the …nancial stabilization of their troubled customers would do the trick.
Banking sector can provide valuable signals to a supplier hesitating to undertake relationship-speci…c investment. In a seminal paper, argues that obtain-ing a bank loan is a particularly suitable way to signal creditworthiness to business partners. Similarly, von Thadden (1995) theoretically shows how a monitoring contract closely resembling a standard bank-…rm lending relationship can lengthen the …rms' planning horizon. An upstream …rm will be more willing to undertake relationshipspeci…c investment knowing that her business partner is creditworthy and shuns myopic behaviour. Besides positive reputational signals, the banks can reassure the supplier also in more direct ways. Financial products like bank guarantee or letter of credit provide a payment-assurance for the supplier and thus o¤er a convenient alternative to the cumbersome route of complicated legal contracts and their lengthy enforcement in courts.
Consequently, a well-developed …nancial (especially banking) system should disproportionately boost industries dependent on the willingness of their business partners to undertake relationship-speci…c investments. We con…rm this theoretical prediction by attesting that industries requiring a high share of relationship-speci…c inputs grow faster in countries with a well developed …nancial system. Furthermore, we provide evidence that this e¤ect comes from a more developed banking sector rather than from a deeper stock market.
Consistent with the theoretical arguments of and von Thadden (1995), our channel works mostly via increased entry of new …rms (extensive margin) and higher capital accumulation. New …rms especially need to signal their creditworthiness in order to stimulate relationship-speci…c investment from their business partners. Existing …rms have already established a reputation with the suppliers and depend less on the signals from third parties like banks. Similarly, the increased planning horizon should a¤ect sectoral output growth primarily via higher capital accumulation.
For our …nal test we turn to the process of bank deregulation in the USA. This is a unique natural experiment as it occurred in di¤erent U.S. states at di¤erent points in time. Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) show that GDP growth, in an average U.S. state, accelerates after relaxing restrictions on intrastate bank entry and expansion. Our results suggest that beyond an overall pro-growth e¤ect the bank deregulation might bene…t disproportionately the industries requiring relationship-speci…c investments from their suppliers.
This paper combines insights from several strands of literature and makes three main contributions. First, it provides evidence for a novel channel through which …nance a¤ects the real economy. Since the seminal work of Rajan and Zingales (1998) , the …nance-growth literature has placed special emphasis on the role of …nancial development in relaxing credit constraints. In our story a well-developed banking sector reassures the suppliers that hesitate to undertake irreversible relationship-speci…c investments.
Second, our paper complements the existing literature on economic speci…city that has stressed comprehensive and enforceable contracts as a (partial) solution to the holdup problem. The recent trade literature (Levchenko 2007 , Nunn 2007 ) builds upon this idea and demonstrates a stronger export performance of industries requiring relationship-speci…c inputs in countries with good institutions, especially in the form of e¤ective contract enforcement. This paper shows that the domestic …nancial system plays an autonomous and equally important role in stimulating relationship-speci…c investment by the upstream suppliers, thus promoting the growth of their downstream customers.
Finally, the last part of the paper contributes to the literature documenting the acceleration in growth rates of the U.S. states after they deregulated their banking system. The main argument contesting the positive e¤ects of this process sees the increased competition and resulting consolidation among banks as an obstacle for the …rms relying on relationship lending. The theoretical and empirical work on this issue has focused on the e¤ects of U.S. bank deregulation on small and/or new enterprises that traditionally depend on relationship banking. 2 Our paper examines an alternative set of bank-dependent …rms and provides some evidence for favourable e¤ects of a competitive banking sector.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section provides theoretical background for our hypothesis. Section 3 explains the methodology and describes the data. Section 4 provides evidence from a broad cross-section of countries. Section 5 reports empirical results from the bank deregulation in a panel of U.S. states. Section 6 concludes.
Theoretical Motivation
An in ‡uential body of theoretical literature (Klein et al. 1978 The traditional literature on the holdup problem thus focuses on potential deliberate abuse of power from the buyer after the supplier has made the relationship-speci…c investment. However, there are two aspects to the holdup problem that in our opinion did not receive an adequate attention. First is the possibility of a vis major holdup due to unexpected economic problems of the downstream customer. A detailed written contract will be of little help for the supplier, if the buyer turns out to be unable to pay the bill. The …nancial consequences for the party undertaking relationship-speci…c investment might be even more severe in this case. Now the buyer does not just try to re-negotiate the original contract, she is objectively not able to meet her …nancial commitment. The supplier will thus de…nitely have to …nd a new buyer for a product adjusted for the needs of the original customer. Second aspect involves the length of the buyer's planning horizon. A buyer with a long-term perspective will be much less willing to endanger a long-term business relationship in order to achieve a short-term gain from renegotiating the original contract.
A supplier usually cannot observe the true …nancial situation or planning horizon of the buyer. However, theoretical work on …nancial intermediaries suggests that a buyer can signal both creditworthiness and a long-term planning horizon via obtaining a loan or a line of credit from her bank. In the next section we apply the methodology of Rajan and Zingales (1998) and estimate the following equation:
where the subscripts i and c indicate industry and country, respectively. As a dependent variable we use several proxies for industrial growth: growth of output, growth of the number of establishments, growth of output per establishment, growth of employment, growth of the capital stock and growth of total factor productivity (TFP). It is important to emphasize that the industry characteristic CI i is computed solely from U.S. industrial data. This approach is based on two assumptions. First, assuming that U.S. markets are well functioning and (relatively) frictionless, equilibrium variables in the United States can be taken as good proxies for exogenous technological characteristics of the production process in a given industry. Second, as long as the relative ranking of industry characteristics is the same across countries, the technological characteristics of the U.S. industries are representative of technologies used in other countries.
Under these assumptions we can interpret the estimated coe¢ cients for the interactions of country and industry characteristics in a causal way.
Another crucial point in this econometric approach is the potential endogeneity of country characteristics like …nancial development. Here we follow the …nance-growth literature and use countries'legal origins to address this issue. La Porta et al. (1998 Porta et al. ( , 1999 show that the origin of a legal system is a strong predictor of the …nancial development in a given country. We instrument the interaction terms of …nancial development and industry characteristics (importance of relationship-speci…c inputs and dependence on external …nance) by the interaction terms of the latter variables with legal origin dummies.
Our database has a complex structure with both country and industry dimensions where heteroskedasticity might be present. If this is the case, the GMM estimator is more e¢ cient than the simple IV estimator. In the absence of heteroskedasticity the GMM estimator is asymptotically equivalent to the IV estimator. 4 However, the optimal weighting matrix that is used in the e¢ cient GMM procedure is a function of fourth moments. Obtaining reasonable estimate of fourth moments requires large sample size.
As a result, the e¢ cient GMM estimator can have poor small sample properties. If in fact the error is homoskedastic, IV would be preferable to e¢ cient GMM in small sample. In our main speci…cation we perform the heteroskedasticity test proposed by Pagan and Hall (1983) and reject the null hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity at 1%
level. Therefore we rely on GMM estimation for our analysis.
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In section 5 we use di¤erences-in-di¤erences estimation based on the removal of restrictions on bank entry and expansion which occurred in di¤erent U.S. states at di¤erent points of time. Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) testify a higher growth for states that deregulated their banking sector (treated group) as opposed to states that have not deregulated yet (control group). To the extent that relaxing entry and expansion barriers leads to a more competitive and e¢ cient banking industry, this result provides support for a causal link from …nance to economic growth. The identifying assumption is the randomness in timing of bank deregulation with respect to economic growth. Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) show that states did not deregulate their banks in anticipation of improved growth prospects. Deregulation usually did not occur in the boom phase of business cycle. Moreover, deregulation driven by anticipated economic boom should result in higher amount of lending. There is only weak evidence for increased bank lending and no evidence for increased investment rate after the reform. The pro-growth 4 Baum et al. (2003) discuss the advantages of using GMM over 2SLS in the presence of heteroskedasticity in the error term. 5 We get very similar results using 2SLS estimation.
e¤ects come from better quality of banks'loan portfolios, not from their bigger size.
We construct a dummy variable equal to one after a state permits intrastate branching via merging and acquisition and zero otherwise. 6 To see whether bank deregulation disproportionately bene…ts industries dependent on relationship-speci…c investment from their suppliers, we estimate the following speci…cation:
where G ist is output growth for industry i in state s at time t, Dereg st is the dummy for bank deregulation in state s at time t, CI i is the contract intensity measure, X ist is a vector of controls that includes initial industry share in total state ( Here we extend this framework and focus on the di¤erential e¤ect of deregulation across industries. Equation (2) is a generalization of the di¤erence in di¤erence approach where the e¤ect of deregulation is estimated as the di¤erence between the change in growth rate of contract-intensive industries before and after deregulation and the change in growth rate of a control group of industries before and after deregulation.
Analogously to equation (1), a positive coe¢ cient 2 implies that bank deregulation disproportionately bene…ts industries requiring a high share of relationship-speci…c inputs.
Coe¢ cient 1 captures the direct e¤ect of deregulation on industrial growth.
The U.S. framework also allows for a deeper examination of the possible interactions between our channel and the institutional mechanism implied by the incomplete contracts literature. Financial development and the quality of the legal system can act as substitutes or complements in stimulating relationship-speci…c investments. To give an example, bank guarantees or letters of credit present a direct substitute for detailed contracts and their legal enforcement. At the same time, such bank products can reassure suppliers only if at least some level of legal quality is present. Similar ambiguity prevails with respect to signals a bank can send about creditworthiness and long-term planning 6 Following the literature we drop the year of deregulation from our estimation and observations for South Dakota and Delaware. Those states have a unique history related to credit card business which could lead to biased estimates (see e.g. Strahan 2003 ).
horizon of the buyer. On the one hand, supplier receiving credible signals about buyer's reliability can be more relaxed about the quality of legal system. A creditworthy and long-term oriented buyer could will not easily jeopardize her reputation and default on her commitments even if she would be able to do it. On the other hand, credibility of bank signals increases in the credibility of the buyer's bank which in turn increases in country's overall legal and institutional standards.
The relative importance of these substitution and complementarity e¤ects will vary from country to country, depending on the level of development and other (possibly nonobservable) country-speci…c characteristics. 7 It is therefore more appropriate to test this issue within the sample of the U.S. states rather than in a broad cross-country context.
All U.S. states are subject to uniform federal law and the overall institutional quality is very similar. We can thus hold the general legal framework constant, while examining di¤erences alongside one speci…c dimension -quality of state courts. In particular, we augment equation (2) by adding two interaction terms:
where Courts s is a measure for the quality of state courts whose direct e¤ect is captured by the state …xed e¤ects. A positive estimated coe¢ cient 4 would suggest that the legal system and bank deregulation act as complements in promoting relationshipspeci…c investment. A negative coe¢ cient for the triple interaction term would indicate substitutability between the two channels maintaining relationship-speci…c assets.
Data 3.2.1 International Sample
The international industry-level data come from the Trade, Production, and Protection
Database by Nicita and Olarreaga (2007) that has data for up to 100 countries over the The data for …nancial development is taken from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2000), and contains various indicators of …nancial development across countries and over time. In our analysis, we use two proxies for …nancial development: private credit by banks to GDP and stock market capitalization to GDP, the standard proxies for …nancial development in the empirical literature. Due to possible endogeneity concerns we use the initial level of …nancial development, measured in 1980 or earliest year available.
The data for quality of legal institutions, the "rule of law", is taken from the database constructed by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2005) . This is the weighted average of several variables that measure perceived e¤ectiveness and predictability of the judicial system and contract enforcement in each country. For our analysis we use data for 1996 which is the earliest available estimate for this variable.
For instrumental variable regressions, we rely on the data of legal origin from Glaeser In Appendices C and D we present data sources as well as summary statistics for the international data we use in our analysis. Appendix E presents the correlation matrix for the interaction terms used in the cross-country context.
Sample of U.S. States
The dates of bank branch deregulation in di¤erent U.S. states are taken from Strahan (2003) . In the majority of states, this deregulation occurred in two successive stages.
The …rst stage happened when the restriction of intrastate branching via merging and acquisition (M&A) was abandoned, the second stage occurred when overall restrictions on intrastate branching were removed. Since the time span between these dates is relatively short it is di¢ cult to disentangle their e¤ects. Following the literature, we focus on dates of the …rst stage when constructing the bank deregulation dummy. The data on the Gross State Product for the U.S. states are taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and are reported according to US SIC industry classi…cation, in current dollars. We transform these data into real dollars using states price de ‡ator.
Following the seminal paper of Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) , we focus on the period from 1978 till 1992. 10 Nunn (2007) computes his contract intensity measure for input-output classi…cation, while the manufacturing data from BEA are reported according to the 2digit SIC1972
classi…cation. First we transform input-output data into NAICS1997 classi…cation (these two classi…cation are very similar). Then we aggregate contract intensity measure over ranges of industries belonging to the same 2digit SIC1972 category using the concordance tables from NAICS1997 to SIC1987 and from SIC1987 to SIC1972. quality. 12 Kahan (2006) argues that the overall ranking of state courts is reasonably constant over time. When estimating speci…cation (3), we address the issue of possible signi…cant shifts in ranking and use the "overall state grade" from both the study's …rst and last year.
4 International Evidence 4.1 OLS Estimation: Banks, Law and Stock Markets Table 1 reports the results of estimating equation (1) using OLS. The dependent variable is the average output growth for each industry and country. The …rst column of Table 1 reports the estimation results of our baseline speci…cation which includes the industry's share of total GDP at the beginning of the sample period and the interaction term of 10 
Instrumental Variables Estimation
The results of the OLS estimation cannot be taken as conclusive evidence for our main hypothesis due to the possibility of reverse causality a¤ecting both country characteristics (…nancial development F D c and rule of law RL c ) used in previous regressions. If industries requiring a high share of relationship-speci…c inputs contribute disproportionately to overall economic growth, the country might have stronger incentives to invest into …nancial and institutional development. To take care of this potential endogeneity problem, we use countries'legal origins to construct our instrumental variables, follow- 14 We also run estimations with other proxies for …nancial development such as stock market turnover or stock value traded. The results are qualitatively similar and are available upon request.
ing the existing literature. 15 Legal origin can in ‡uence di¤erent spheres of economic and political life of the country which might pose problems when using it as instrument. In our case the …nancial and institutional development are highly correlated with overall economic progress. For example, sectors with a high share of relationship-speci…c inputs might also require a disproportionate share of skilled labour or modern technologies. The contract-intensive sectors might then grow faster in developed countries that happen to be rich in human capital and operate on the technological frontier. To take care of this problem, we add the interaction terms of the industry dummies with the log of real income per worker into regression equation. 18 The overall economic development can now a¤ect each sector in an unrestricted way via those interactions. We thus explicitly control for the possibility that developed countries have some (possibly unobservable) features that facilitate growth in contract-intensive industries. 19 We report the results of the GMM estimation with industry dummies interactions in columns (4), (5) and (6) of Table 2 . Comparing these last three columns with columns Here we combine both approaches. 19 An alternative way would be to include additional interactions in our instrumental variable estimation, but it would be extremely di¢ cult to control for all possible channels. There might always be some other unobserved characteristic of developed countries generating a higher growth in the sectors relying on relationship-speci…c investments from their suppliers. 
Decomposing Banks'Pro-Growth E¤ect
So far we have provided evidence that a well-developed banking system plays an important role in promoting the sectors requiring relationship-speci…c investments from their suppliers. In this section we study in more detail the speci…c channels through which this link between banks and the real economy operates. We implement two decompositions of the overall output growth. First, we examine whether our mechanism works on the extensive margin (via increased entry of new …rms) or on the intensive margin (via accelerated growth of existing …rms). Then we carry out a standard growth accounting exercise testing whether overall growth comes from higher capital accumulation, increased employment or faster technological progress (TFP growth). Tables 3 and 4 isolate the extensive and the intensive margin of output growth.
The dependent variables are average growth in number of establishments (Table 3) and average growth per establishment ( Table 4 ). The …rst three columns correspond to the OLS regressions from the …rst three columns of Table 1 , the following six columns mirror the instrumental variable (GMM) estimation of Table 2 . Columns (4) to (6) present the baseline GMM estimation and the last three columns include the interaction terms of industry dummies with GDP per worker. The results provide clear evidence that the extensive margin is the driving force behind the positive e¤ect of a strong bank system on the sectors with a high share of relationship-speci…c inputs. In Table 3 , the variable of interest CI i F D c is always positive and statistically signi…cant. In the case of the intensive margin (Table 4) , the disproportionate positive impact of bank credit over GDP on the growth of contract-intensive industries is statistically signi…cant only in two out of nine speci…cations. Especially, there is no signi…cant e¤ect once we control for the endogeneity of …nancial development and rule of law (columns three to nine).
These results suggest that banks facilitate the creation of new …rms in contractintensive industries rather than helping the existing companies to expand. This is in line with the signalling channel by . A new buyer with no existing record of ful…lling her commitment will face more wariness from the suppliers of relationshipspeci…c inputs. Consequently, she will be heavily dependent on credible signals about her …nancial stability that arise from a successfully obtained bank loan. In contrast, an existing …rm has usually already built up a stable network of business partners.
An established buyer can thus rely more on her own reputation and familiarity with suppliers and less on reputational signals from third parties like banks.
Next, we analyze the e¤ect of …nancial development on sectors with a high share of relationship-speci…c inputs within the growth accounting framework. In order to do so, we reconstruct capital stock using the methodology of Hall and Jones (1999) and TFP using the methodology of Solow (1957) . Appendix B provides details of the procedure. Tables 5 to 7 summarize the outcome of this second channel decomposition. The dependent variables are average growth of capital (Table 5) , average growth in employment (Table 6 ) and average TFP growth (Table 7) . Again, the …rst three columns report the OLS estimations, the following three present the results of the baseline GMM estimation and the last three columns report the results of the GMM estimation augmented with the interactions of industry dummies and GDP per worker.
The growth accounting suggests a higher capital accumulation as the most important source of the banking sector's bene…cial impact on the industries relying on relationshipspeci…c investment from their suppliers. After correcting for the endogeneity of …nancial and institutional development in columns (4) to (9) of Table 5 , the variable of interest We have less clear-cut evidence for a positive role of the banking system in boosting employment in industries with a high share of relationship-speci…c inputs. In Table   6 the estimated coe¢ cient for the main interaction CI i F D c is always positive and mostly signi…cant. Still, the relationship between …nancial development and employment growth in the contract-intensive industries appears less robust than in the case of capital accumulation.
There is no evidence that the banking system promotes economic growth via productivity growth in the sectors dependent on relationship-speci…c investment from their suppliers. Table 7 presents the estimation results with TFP growth as a dependent variable. The results in the …rst three columns show the interaction term of bank credit and contract intensity entering the OLS regressions at the 10% level of signi…cance. Once we control for endogeneity (last six columns), this signi…cance disappears and sometimes the main variable CI i F D c enters with a negative sign.
Overall, the two decompositions performed in this section suggest that a strong banking system promotes industries with a high share of relationship-speci…c inputs mainly via increased entry of new …rms and higher capital accumulation. These results con…rm the empirical relevance of the theoretical channels emphasizing bank loans as a signalling device and as a source of long-term investment planning horizon for the …rms (von Thadden 1995).
Evidence from U.S. Bank Branch Deregulation
The analysis based on international data suggests that a strong banking sector particularly promotes industries dependent on relationship-speci…c investments from their suppliers. In order to further investigate this issue we check our prediction using data Looking beyond aggregate outcomes, bank deregulation could have a particularly big impact on …rms trying to stimulate relationship-speci…c investment from their suppliers.
A buyer in a stable long-term relationship with a strong bank has better chances to reassure a business partner about her own reliability and …nancial stability. However, the overall e¤ect of bank deregulation on established bank-…rm relationships is theoretically and empirically ambiguous.
The increased quality of surviving banks should bene…t …rms depending on reputational signals connected with an approved loan. Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) show that intrastate branch deregulation leads to a decrease in shares of total loans corresponding to nonperforming loans, loans written o¤ during the year and loans to the bank insiders Similarly to small and new enterprises, the …rms requiring relationship-speci…c investments from their suppliers also disproportionately depend on a committed long-term relationship with their bank. In this context a pro-growth e¤ect of bank deregulation on industries with a high share of relationship-speci…c inputs would suggest an overall positive e¤ect of increased bank competition on relationship lending. Table 8 presents the estimation results for the sample of U.S. states. Our variable of interest is the interaction term of the deregulation dummy with the contract intensity measure. In all speci…cations we include the initial share of the industry in the state manufacturing output to capture an expected slower growth of bigger and more mature industries. We also control for overall economic growth in a given state and year. The The state-industry …xed e¤ects now capture the impact of state courts'quality on the industries with a high share of relationship-speci…c inputs.
Another concern relates to possible changes of legal quality over time. Columns (4) and (5) repeat the estimation of the previous two columns using the most recent data for the quality of state courts from the year 2008. The results are qualitatively the same.
One caveat deserves a mention at this place. The overall legal and institutional standards in the United States are rather high, despite the di¤erences in the quality of state courts. The substitutability between legal quality and strong banks in reassuring the suppliers of relationship-speci…c inputs can be the consequence of this fact. In countries at a lower development stage the complementarity forces might prevail as the credibility of the buyer's bank might require at least some degree of legal and institutional quality.
An interesting topic for further research could be to explore the substitutability versus complementarity between legal and …nancial system in stimulating relationship-speci…c investment by exploiting legal di¤erences across provinces of a big developing country.
Conclusion
Several prominent papers (Williamson 1971 (Williamson , 1979 inputs. The empirical results in this paper suggest that …nancial development might be at least equally important for the economic performance of such contract-intensive industries. 20 A well-developed banking sector seems especially important in this regard. 20 To be precise, the results of this paper are not directly comparable with those in the trade literature.
Our dependent variable is the growth of industrial output, while Nunn (2007) and Levchenko (2007) focus on the export performance of industries. This is an important distinction as our channel works This is not to say that institutions do not play a potentially important role in the development of industries requiring relationship-speci…c investments from their suppliers. First, bank products suitable for reassuring the producers of relationship-speci…c inputs often require a functioning legal system. Letters of credit would be a primary example. One might thus view institutional quality and strong banking sector as complements, rather than substitutes. Our results from the sample of U.S. states suggest the prevalence of substitution forces in the case of one highly developed country. However, one could suspect a stronger complementarity between a vigorous banking sector and a functioning legal system in countries at lower stages of development. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Table 2 : Industry Growth -IV Table 3 : Decomposition of Growth, dependent variable growth of number of establishments
(8) Table 4 : Decomposition of Growth, dependent variable growth of output per establishment Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Table 5 : Decomposition of Growth, dependent variable growth of capital
(8) Table 6 : Decomposition of Growth, dependent variable growth of employment
(8) Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Table 7 : Decomposition of Growth, dependent variable TFP Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
